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Expanding Protections of the Rome Statute:
The International Criminal Court Affirms
Charges of Sexual Assault of Child Soldiers
Against Bosco Ntaganda
November 10, 2017
by Heidi Smucker
On June 15, 2017, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
unanimously affirmed the court’s power to bring charges against Bosco Ntaganda for war crimes
of rape and sexual slavery committed against child soldiers. Ntaganda served as a Deputy Chief of
the General Staff for the Force Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC), the military arm
of the Union of Congolese Patriots party, during the 2002-2003 armed conflict in Ituri, Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). While in this post, Ntaganda allegedly assisted in the conscription,
training, and sexual assault and slavery of thousands of child soldiers under the age of 15. The ICC
Trial Chamber VI charged Ntaganda with 13 war crimes stemming from this conflict, including
crimes perpetrated against the child soldiers under his control. He appealed the counts of sexual
war crimes, claiming the court had no jurisdiction over adjudicating instances of rape and sexual
slavery perpetrated against child soldiers by members of the same armed group.
Issues regarding the ICC’s jurisdiction over child soldier sexual assault charges first surfaced in
the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, another leader for the FPLC. During Dyilo’s trial, the initial
list of charges did not include any mention of alleged sexual abuse against the FPLC’s child
soldiers. While Dyilo was eventually convicted of recruiting child soldiers, the ICC trial court
refused to rule on allegations that he raped and sexually enslaved child soldiers. This was a result
of the prosecution’s failure to introduce evidence supporting these charges before the confirmation
of Dyilo’s charges, making their evidence inadmissible.
When Ntaganda’s proceedings began, ICC prosecutors tried again, including counts of sexual war
crimes committed against the FPLC child soldiers in their original list of charges. At pretrial,
Ntaganda argued that while International Humanitarian Law (IHL) prohibits the use of child
soldiers, it does not address issues of violence between members of the same military. For this
reason, Ntaganda’s defense claimed IHL was not applicable in cases of child soldier sexual abuse
by their commanders and did not constitute war crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. However, the
prosecution argued that both the “general” and “special” levels of protection for child soldiers cited
in the Geneva Conventions and IHL enabled the court to classify the FPLC child soldiers as victims
of sexual war crimes.
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions classifies general protections as the humane treatment of
soldiers in armed conflict, guarding them from “violence to life and person” and “outrages on
personal dignity.” Additionally, Article 4 of the second Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions (Protocol II) extends special protections to children, citing that “the special protection
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provided by this Article to children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain
applicable to them if they take direct part in hostilities.”
The trial court agreed with the prosecution, ruling that sexual assault of child soldiers by their
commanding officers is a matter of IHL and therefore subject to protections established by Articles
7 and 8 of the Rome Statute. This was crucial because Article 8 specifically states that the
protections listed are considered in the “framework of international law.” Therefore, the ruling that
crimes committed against child soldiers by members of the same armed forces falls under IHL
provided the ICC with jurisdiction over the crimes and allowed the charges to stand.
The Appeals Chamber upheld this decision, officially extending the Rome Statute’s protections
and the ICC’s jurisdiction to victims of rape, sexual assault, or sexual slavery during armed
conflicts, regardless of their relationship to their perpetrator. This sweeping decision pushed
forward the protections under international humanitarian law and allowed for a broader application
of the Rome Statute. It affords child soldiers another layer of protection on top of the wellestablished war crimes charges for conscription and abuse. For example, in situations where the
components of an armed uprising involving child soldiers are not deemed systemic or widespread
enough to constitute a crime against humanity, if there is proven sexual abuse of the child soldiers
the ICC can still assert jurisdiction and bring a case.
Additionally, this case shed more light on girls and their involvement as child soldiers. Prior
observations have focused more on young men and boys and their violent, forced conscription
during armed conflicts. However, the plight of the young women and girls in the FPLC
demonstrates that girls are not only victims of forced sexual slavery, but are utilized across multiple
roles during a conflict. Nearly 40 percent of child soldier recruits are female as they are seen as
easily manipulated and naturally obedient, making them appealing recruits. From scouting to
combat, girls go beyond the commonly adopted view of “silent victims” and this case helps
recognize female child soldiers in concurrent rights; as both child soldiers and victims of sexual
abuse.
While this case namely benefits female child soldiers in a new way, it also raises awareness that
male child soldiers are also vulnerable to sexual abuse. The brainwashing and fear tactics used to
assert control over young boys recruited as child soldiers often includes sexual violence. This can
mean rape and abuse by their fellow child soldiers and commanders or instances where they are
forced to rape civilian women and girls. Sexual violence was rampant throughout the FPLC, and
commanding officers routinely allowed female child soldiers to be passed between their fellow
soldiers as sexual objects. Thus far, the ICC and other international courts and tribunals have failed
to recognize the complex issue of sexual violence against men and boys, often times classifying
such crimes as torture or inhumane treatment.
Male victims of sexual assault are largely invisible, and ignoring or misclassifying these
crimes perpetuates the stigmas erroneously attached to the issue, including the labeling of male
victims as weak or homosexual. However, the Ntaganda case applies a more expansive and
inclusive view of the abuse of child soldiers, both for girls and boys that are enlisted. Viewing
them as victims of both their conscription and their sexual abuse opens the door for a deeper
understanding of their circumstances and what should be done to provide them with justice.
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Perhaps most importantly, by adopting a parallel view of the abuses suffered by child soldiers and
recognizing these crimes under the Rome Statute, the ICC has contributed to raising the level of
accountability for crimes of sexual violence under international law. From this ruling, governing
bodies within IHL can facilitate wider discussions of sexual violence and its context within, and
relationship to, war crimes and how they are identified and prosecuted.
The ICC’s decision to categorize acts of sexual violence against child soldiers by the same
members of an armed group not only sets a new precedent for the court, but also expands the lens
through which it examines the overarching issue of sexual violence. This case serves to further
clarify the rights of child soldiers under IHL while opening the door for greater awareness and
accountability.
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The Changing Face of the Suicide Bomber
Under Boko Haram
November 22, 2017
by Susan Imerman
It’s just after midday when men gather in a crowded mosque in northeastern Nigeria for Friday
prayer. Just down the emptied road, a young girl of about fifteen walks forward. Trembling, she
approaches her instructed destination – the mosque. She pulls a small lever on her belt and
suddenly triggers an explosion. Since 2011, Boko Haram, the ISIS-affiliated militant group located
in northern Nigeria, has killed more than 30,000 people in Nigeria and neighboring countries and
displaced 2.1 million. Boko Haram, whose name means “Western education is forbidden” in the
local Hausa dialect, seeks to institute Sharia law throughout the region and uses whatever means
necessary—even young female bombers—to achieve its goal.
Since its founding in 2002, Boko Haram has wreaked havoc through a wave of bombings,
assassinations, abductions, and most recently, the use of female suicide bombers. Located in the
northeastern region of Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria, Boko Haram controls an area
mostly populated by the Kanuri ethnic group, who maintain a firm anti-Western mentality and
supply the majority of Boko Haram fighters. In April 2014, Boko Haram drew international
attention by abducting more than 250 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok; a rural Nigerian village
located deep in the Boko Haram-controlled territory of Borno State. The jihadist group offered the
girls a choice: join the militants or become their slaves. About half of them chose to join and were
taken away, never to be heard from again. The widespread condemnation of this kidnapping was
a turning point for the group’s leaders, who discovered that the victims’ gender and youth directly
correlated with the increased global attention.
In August 2016, Boko Haram split and announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi would take over as
the new leader. Since the shift in leadership, the group’s fighters launched an increased number of
suicide bombings against tactical locations such as military barracks, universities, and hospitals.
According to UNICEF, “more than 110 children have been used as suicide bombers since the start
of 2017 – at least 76 of them girls. Most were under fifteen years old.” A report released in August
2017 by West Point shows that Boko Haram has now set a record for deploying more female
bombers than any other terrorist group in history. The relentless string of bombings has cast a
shadow of distrust and terror over northeastern Nigeria and many people mention their fear of
women at checkpoints, in crowded areas, and in mosques. Soldiers and civilians are on high alert
for anyone suspicious, “and usually that means any women or girl, most of whom wear long head
scarves and garments that could cover an explosive belt.” Mistaken killings continue to increase.
In the last three months of 2016 alone, the UN reported that thirteen children from ages eleven to
seventeen were killed after being wrongly identified as suicide bombers.
In response to the widespread attacks, the Nigerian government has worked with the international
community to guard against future bombings and to take down Boko Haram for good.
Under Article Three common to the four Geneva Conventions, an impartial humanitarian body
may, in certain circumstances, intervene to prevent “an armed conflict not of international
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character.” Article Three and customary international law regulate instances where the
international community may provide protection to civilian victims of non-international hostilities
such as the one between Nigerian forces and Boko Haram. Accordingly, international efforts are
in effect to prevent the launch of future attacks. In 2017, the UN Security Council adopted
resolutions condemning Boko Haram’s numerous terrorist attacks and strongly encouraged local
governments to “enhance military cooperation, and to move vigorously and decisively to cut
funding flows to individuals, groups….and entities on the ISIL Sanctions List, including Boko
Haram.” Additionally, the Security Council urged regional governments to implement policies
that promote defections from Boko Haram and ISIL and to de-radicalize and reintegrate those who
had defected. The enhanced military cooperation is also supported by humanitarian efforts from
non-governmental actors. UNICEF continues to work with the Nigerian military and employs
humanitarian workers in the region to help rescue the thousands of children and women still under
Boko Haram’s dominance. Efforts from both Nigerian governmental forces and the international
community have helped retake Boko Haram-controlled territory and have brought increased
attention to the ongoing horrors of the fight against the vicious militant group.
Through the use of females as the group’s main suicide bombers, Boko Haram stigmatizes women
as killers, increasing public suspicion and hardship for women and girls throughout the region.
Despite its tumultuous history, Boko Haram has outlived other militant groups in Nigeria building
a presence in neighboring states where it has carried out attacks and recruited additional fighters.
Since Boko Haram’s rise to power, ISIS’ influence in the region has greatly shifted, and with this
change, has come a new image of the “suicide-bomber;” an image increasingly young and
predominantly female.
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South Africa Exposes Limitations of the
International Criminal Court
December 1, 2017
by Matthew Reiter
The international human rights community may have breathed a sigh of relief at South
Africa’s announcement in March 2017 that it would revoke its attempt to leave the International
Criminal Court (ICC), but there are likely more reasons to worry than rejoice. Beyond South
Africa’s flagrant disregard for its obligations under the ICC and the United Nations Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), South
Africa’s actions expose the various weaknesses of the ICC: namely its inability to enforce its
decisions.
As a member of the Genocide Convention, along with 148 other countries, Article IV makes clear
that persons committing genocide or crimes against humanity will be punished, even if that person
is a public official. Facing increased scrutiny and condemnation by the ICC, South Africa
announced its intent to withdraw from the ICC in its entirety in October 2016. Some African
leaders have called the ICC “an instrument of modern colonialism,” as all prior ICC rulings
have convicted Africans. This is the reason cited by South African and other African leaders for
their own attempts to abandon the body. The African Union issued a resolution in early 2017
expressing its approval of mass withdrawal from the ICC, but Burundi is the only country that
has formally withdrawn to date (The Gambia came close to withdrawing as well but rescinded its
declaration of intent to withdraw).
Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir has managed to evade an international arrest warrant
since 2009. He is accused of genocide and crimes against humanity in the Darfur region of western
Sudan. In 2003, Bashir ordered a counterinsurgency against minority non-Arab rebel groups,
which brought an estimated 300,000 deaths, over two million persons displaced, schools bombed,
wells poisoned, and countless women and girls raped. Since then, it is reported that Bashir has
crossed international borders 131 times and visited fourteen countries that are members of the ICC,
including the 2015 visit to Johannesburg for an African Union meeting.
It is often the case that states, when faced with international conflict or scrutiny, profess that
domestic law trumps international obligations. Under the 2002 Rome Statute, which established
the ICC, “countries are obligated to arrest anyone sought by the tribunal. Yet according to South
Africa’s Justice Minister Michael Masutha, the Rome Statute ‘is in conflict and inconsistent with’
South Africa’s law that grants diplomatic immunity to visiting state leaders. Rather than accepting
its responsibilities under the Statute, South Africa’s government instead submitted a bill to
Parliament to withdraw from the ICC in its entirety. The International Criminal Court rejected this
“thin argument” ruling in July 2017 that South Africa had “in brazen defiance of the ICC
warrants…flouted its duty to international law” by failing to arrest Bashir (the State hurried Bashir
to a plane back to Sudan while domestic courts were ruling on whether to arrest him).
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South Africa’s attempt to withdraw from the ICC was stymied by its own courts. The High
Court ruled that the attempt was “unconstitutional and invalid,” as it was done without
Parliamentary consultation and approval. While South Africa’s failure to unilaterally abandon the
ICC could be seen as an indication of the Courts’ strength (it was generally thought that a flood
of other states would follow South Africa’s lead), the specific plight of the Bashir case in actuality
underscores the Court’s inability to impose its rulings. Multiple arrest warrants have been issued
against Bashir, yet he has managed to freely travel between and within countries that are members
of the International Criminal Court. The ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, specifically
points to the United Nations’ failure to publicly condemn six ICC member-countries where Bashir
has traveled. By failing to truly support enforcement of ICC rulings, the international community
is allowing continued impunity for those who have committed major war crimes and failing the
millions of victims who have suffered Bashir’s genocide. It is vital that international stakeholders,
such as the United Nations Security Counsel, increase its collective pressure on states providing
sanctuary to such criminals, rather than sending a message that those who commit genocide can
enjoy long-enduring exemption from justice.
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